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Abstract
Vision Zero (VZ) is a public program that aims to have zero fatalities or serious injuries from road traffic crashes. This
article examines various major components of VZ: how VZ redefines road safety, how VZ principles and philosophies
can be applied to modern car and road designs, and how VZ can be applied to traffic. Applications of these principles
to real-world traffic infrastructure are explored in order to show policymakers the toolkits available to increase road
safety while taking into consideration local contexts.
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Introduction
More than 1.2 million people worldwide are killed each
year from road traffic crashes, and an additional 50 million
people are injured (World Health Organization 2015).
These crashes are often perceived as isolated incidents
caused by driving errors, rather than being viewed collect-
ively as a public health problem. However, viewing crashes
as errors has led to an emphasis on enacting road safety
measures that solely focus on road users (Tingvall and
Haworth 1999). Certainly, road users are an important
part of the road transport system, but infrastructure
(including enforcement infrastructure) is also important.
A “systems perspective” that takes into account the
interaction of design elements and all actors in the road
transport system is necessary to achieve the highest level
of road safety (Elvebakk 2007). One policy that aims to do
exactly that is Vision Zero (VZ), which was created in
Sweden and adopted by the Swedish parliament in 1997
(Johansson 2009). While there are outstanding papers that
describe the basic ideas behind VZ, a lot has been learned
since and most are written for an urban planning audi-
ence. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine
how VZ redefines road safety as a public health issue, to
update the literature on VZ, and to explore how local
context could guide its implementation.
VZ’s long-term goal, as the name suggests, is to have
zero fatalities or serious injuries from road traffic “acci-
dents” (Tingvall and Haworth 1999). While that might
not be a realistic goal, its proponents believe that there
is no such thing as a traffic “accident” and that every
crash is avoidable. This drastically changes the way road
users and policymakers view road safety.
VZ redefines road safety by taking a public health ap-
proach to collisions, i.e., that they are a preventable
health threat. As such, VZ explicitly states that responsi-
bility for road traffic collisions is shared between road
users and system designers (Tingvall and Haworth 1999;
Belin et al. 2012), such as transportation safety experts,
educators, public health professionals, and car designers
and manufacturers (McAndrews 2013). As such, system
design is a collective interdisciplinary effort.
In addition to providing a new framework for thinking
about road safety, VZ also provides a toolkit of design
(e.g., implementation of median barriers, modern round-
abouts, speed humps, pedestrian islands, curb extensions,
etc.) and enforcement methods (e.g., technological improve-
ments, installation of speed cameras, red light cameras, etc.)
that make car travel safer (City of New York 2014;
Walljasper 2015; http://www.visionzeroinitiative.com/;
Swedish Transport Administration 2012). The design
elements complement the enforcement elements, and
together form a network of safety measures intended to
slow traffic, provide safe havens for pedestrians, and to
reduce road hazards.
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This paper begins by examining the general philosophy
of VZ and how VZ adopts the public health perspective
on road safety. The second part of this paper explores
the design principles of VZ. The last section of this
paper concludes with examples of how VZ principles
can be applied to real-world traffic infrastructure in
order to make roads safer, considering local contexts.
Vision Zero’s philosophy
VZ was first adopted in Sweden in 1997, when the
Swedish Parliament passed a bill on traffic safety (the
Road Traffic Safety Bill). Surprisingly, VZ was not imple-
mented in response to a relatively high death rate from
road traffic collisions; Sweden already had one of the
lowest rates of road traffic casualties in the world. Rather,
VZ was implemented because advocates argued that
any deaths were too high of a price to pay for mobility
(Elvebakk 2007).
This view was meant to contrast with what was per-
ceived to be the common belief that road traffic crashes
and fatalities are a “necessary evil to be accepted in the
interests of personal mobility” (Tingvall and Haworth
1999). VZ emphasizes that safety and mobility cannot be
weighed against each other. Instead, mobility has to be-
come a function of safety so that greater mobility is
afforded only when a road system is safe (Tingvall and
Haworth 1999). This approach follows the standards set
in the air, railway, and nuclear power industries, which
consider any injuries or deaths as preventable tragedies
(Elvebakk 2007; McAndrews 2013). VZ asserts that the
road traffic industry should not be the exception to this
rule (Elvebakk 2007).
Traditionally, the road user has been viewed as the
central entity responsible for road traffic safety (Tingvall
and Haworth 1999). Conventional crash analyses show
that about 90–95% of all crashes are caused by road users
(Johansson 2009), neglecting other underlying conditions
that contribute to these collisions. As a result of this con-
ventional view, most countries today pass rules and regu-
lations that govern how road users should behave. Under
this view, legal actions are typically brought against one of
two road users involved in a collision (Tingvall and
Haworth 1999). In contrast, VZ attempts to shift the re-
sponsibility so that all actors within the system are held
accountable, causing them to become more centrally
involved in road safety.
These actors include not just the users, but also auto-
mobile manufacturers, government transportation author-
ities, and other entities (McAndrews 2013). Their shared
responsibility for road safety has significant implications
for the future of road travel. For example, autonomous
vehicles are becoming more popular amongst car man-
ufacturers. Under the traditional system, risk-averse man-
ufacturers may be inclined not to implement such
technical features because they are costly. Under VZ,
however, manufacturers may be held accountable for
failing to implement such life-saving innovations. Spe-
cifically, VZ states that:
1. Since system designers are responsible for the design,
operation, and use of the road transport system, they
are also responsible for the safety of the entire road
system.
2. Road users are responsible for adhering to the rules
set forth by system designers when using the road
transport system.
3. If road users fail to follow said rules due to lack of
knowledge, approval or ability, or if injuries do occur,
then system designers are responsible for taking
further action to prevent people from being killed or
seriously injured (Tingvall and Haworth 1999).
While under VZ principles, drivers and designers share
liability. However, drivers are still responsible for driving
safely since they assume significant risk, and drivers need
to comply with any traffic regulations to ensure the safety
of the road transport system.
Since VZ was first adopted by Sweden, it has grown
into a global vision. Countries such as Norway, the
United Kingdom, and Canada have all incorporated VZ’s
philosophies into their road safety plans. Multiple cities
in the United States have also adopted VZ, including
New York City, Austin, Boston, San Francisco, Seattle,
Portland, and San Diego. While all of these communities
strive to fulfill VZ’s goals, they have implemented the
program in a variety of ways to meet their own needs
and means. Each country or city that adopts VZ has a
unique culture and infrastructure, thus system designers
need to take into consideration the existing surrounding
environment before implementing the program.
A public health perspective on road safety
Road safety is increasingly being considered a public
health problem. The World Health Organization has la-
beled road traffic collisions as a major global health haz-
ard as it is one of the leading and fastest growing causes
of disability and death (World Health Organization 2015).
It is increasingly becoming common to refer to injuries
from these traffic crashes as an “epidemic” (Elvebakk
2007). Indeed, traffic crashes are now the number one
cause of death for people aged 15–29 years (World Health
Organization 2015). By considering crashes an epidemic,
VZ aims to give the same type of attention that com-
municable diseases, such as malaria and polio, receive
worldwide.
By making the case that most road traffic “accidents”
are not actually accidental, but are predictable and pre-
ventable (Elvebakk 2007), road safety measures become
Kim et al. Injury Epidemiology  (2017) 4:1 Page 2 of 9
a shared responsibility between transportation and pub-
lic health officials. This way, a traffic crash that does not
result in loss of health is not a safety problem, only a
cost (Johansson 2009). Consequently, VZ does not call
for a state of zero collisions, only zero deaths (Belin et al.
2012). By focusing on preventing crashes that cause fatal-
ities and serious injuries, VZ creates a design mentality
that emphasizes safety while allowing for some errors
(Tingvall and Haworth 1999).
Design principles of vision zero
The dominant safety strategy in road design has been to
increase (and, when possible, to straighten) the physical
space for drivers and cars, through the use of wider
lanes and wider, straighter roads. The logic behind this
is that if a driver runs off the road, a wider or straighter
road allows for the driver to have more room to maneu-
ver the vehicle back into the lane. Under VZ, these
moves are viewed as undesirable because more space in
the road contributes to higher speeds and, therefore, a
driving environment in which injuries or fatalities are
more likely (Johansson 2009).
This view of the trade off between collisions (which
might be more likely in some circumstances when roads
are narrow or have curves) and severe injuries is central
to VZ. Under VZ, the ideal road system is one in which
the human tolerance for mechanical forces is not
exceeded – a concept originally proposed by William
Haddon Jr. (Haddon 1970; Haddon 1980). According to
Claes Tingvall, former Director of Traffic Safety in the
Swedish Road Administration, the risk of injury from a
road traffic crash can be viewed as an exponential dose-
response relationship. If the mechanical forces (kinetic
energy) that people face during road traffic crashes can
be kept below the threshold for severe injuries, the road
transport system can be considered safe (Tingvall and
Haworth 1999).
Such thresholds are determined by assuming a certain
level of vehicle safety. For example, well-designed cars are
assumed to tolerate a maximum speed of 70 km/h for
frontal impacts, and 50 km/h for side impacts (Tingvall
and Haworth 1999). Studies have also shown that the sur-
vival rate is high when pedestrians are hit below 30 km/h
(Anderson et al. 1997). Thus, these thresholds are used as
a starting point for designing safer road systems under
VZ.
The two main ways VZ tries to manage kinetic energy
are by integrating compatible traffic components and by
physically separating incompatible ones. Some examples
include:
1. Vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians or
cyclists, should not be exposed to vehicles at speeds
over 30 km/h (18.6 mph). If separation is not
possible, then reduce the vehicle speed to 30 km/h.
Cyclists can reach these speeds, particularly on
descents, and should also be separated from
pedestrians or slowed.
2. Car occupants should not be exposed to other
vehicles at speeds over 50 km/h (31.07 mph) in 90°
crossings. If this is not possible, separate, reduce the
angle (thereby altering the vector of force of the
collision such that it reduces severe injury or death),
or reduce the speed to 50 km/h.
3. Car occupants should not be exposed to oncoming
traffic at speeds over 70 km/h (43.5 mph) if vehicles
are about the same weight. If vehicles are of
different weight, speeds should not exceed 50 km/h.
If this is not possible, then separate traffic, balance
automobile weights, or reduce speeds according to
the maximum differential in vehicle weight.
4. Car occupants should not be exposed to the side of
the road at speeds over 70 km/h, or 50 km/h if there
are trees or other potentially dangerous objects. If
this is not possible, separate cars from the side of
the road or reduce speeds to 70 km/h or 50 km/h
(according to road side conditions) (Johansson 2009).
“Separations” in this case are physical separations, such
as crash barriers, tunnels, bridges, crossings at different
levels, and different roads for different traffic vehicles, such
as bicycle lanes. Temporal separation (e.g., traffic lights) is
not considered a proper method of separation, and a space
of just a few meters is not considered a spatial separation
(Johansson 2009), such as when lines on the road are all
that separate cyclists from traffic.
Vision zero toolkit
VZ does not have a step-by-step manual on how to
apply its philosophy and design principles; rather, it gives
suggestions to system designers and safety planners on
different methods they could utilize to attain a safer road
system. While there is no one right way to implement VZ,
some common road design elements have emerged in dif-
ferent VZ programs. This “toolkit” includes guidelines on
how to optimize factors such as education, enforcement,
and structural improvements, such as installation of me-
dian barriers, roundabouts, speed humps, and pedestrian
islands. For illustration purposes, we briefly discuss a few
of the structural changes recommended in the toolkit to
illustrate the benefits and challenges of implementing core
design features of VZ.
Median barriers
Cross median crashes, which result when a vehicle
crosses into oncoming traffic, are one of the most severe
types of crashes because of the high speeds involved and
the risk of head-on collisions (Chitturi et al. 2011). One
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way to prevent such crashes is by installing median
barriers. There are three main types of median barriers:
rigid barriers, semi-rigid barriers, and cable barriers.
A common type of rigid median barriers are concrete
barriers. Even though the installation cost of concrete
barriers is more expensive than other types of median
barriers, they are often used due to their relatively low
life-cycle cost and maintenance-free characteristics (U.S.
Department of Transportation Federal Highway Admin-
istration 2015). They have also proven to be extremely
effective in preventing cars from crossing the median
into oncoming traffic, especially in areas with high traffic
volumes and high speeds. However, crashes involving
concrete median barriers are associated with severe in-
juries. This is because rigid barrier systems absorb the
least amount of kinetic energy in crashes, transferring the
energy to road users in traffic collisions (U.S. Department
of Transportation Federal Highway Administration 2015).
In contrast, both cable and semi-rigid barriers (e.g.,
guardrails) are much more forgiving since these barriers
absorb most of the energy during collisions (U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation Federal Highway Administration
2015; Alluri et al. 2014; Hu and Donnell 2010). In fact,
one study found that the odds of injury, as compared to
hitting a hazardous object (e.g., utility pole, tree, wall,
building, etc.), were reduced by 39% when hitting a con-
crete median barrier, 65% when hitting a guardrail, and
between 78 and 85% when hitting a cable median bar-
rier. The study also found that the odds of injury when
hitting a guardrail were 43% lower than when hitting a
concrete median barrier, and the odds of injury when
hitting a near-side median cable barrier were 57% lower
than when hitting a guardrail (Zou et al. 2014). These
results suggest that cable median barriers are effective in
minimizing harm.
However, while installation of cable median barriers de-
creases crash severity, it actually increases collision fre-
quency, highlighting the importance of systems thinking
within Vision Zero. For example, a meta-analysis of the
safety value of median barriers concluded that cable me-
dian barriers increase the crash rate by 30%, but reduce
the chance of sustaining a fatal and personal injury when
in a crash by 20 and 10%, respectively (Elvik 1995). In
Washington state, the total number of crashes in medians
almost doubled when cable median barriers were installed
(Ray et al. 2009). The installation of cable median barriers
was also found to increase single-vehicle crashes on wide,
depressed medians by 70% (Villwock et al. 2011). Since
cable median barriers tend to increase crash frequency,
they should not be considered as a default option.
Specifically, concrete barriers might be superior to
cable median barriers in environments where barriers
are frequently hit by vehicles, since guardrails and cable
barriers require more maintenance after a crash (U.S.
Department of Transportation Federal Highway Admin-
istration 2015; Zou et al. 2014). Additionally, the type of
vehicle common to the area is important to consider
since odds of injury among motorcyclists have been
found to be greater in crashes with w-beam guardrails
than with concrete median barriers (Daniello and Gabler
2011). This means that concrete median barriers may be
preferred in low-income settings where motorcycles or
motorbikes are the dominant mode of transportation.
Furthermore, if autonomous vehicles become more com-
mon, installation of cable median barriers may present
challenges since autonomous vehicles may have greater
difficulty detecting smaller objects, such as cable median
barriers. There is a strong need for researchers to develop
mathematical models that provide policy feedback given
characteristics such as crash history, ability to repair and
maintain barriers, road user mix, and compatibility with
existing infrastructure.
Modern roundabouts
Many injury crashes occur in intersections because of the
high concentration of vehicles and pedestrians at these lo-
cations. There are numerous ways to try and control these
intersections (e.g., all-way stops, two-way stops, traffic sig-
nals, etc.) (Ewing and Dumbaugh 2009). Depending on
the circumstances, some methods are more effective than
others at reducing the incidence and severity of traffic in-
juries. One method that has become favored under the VZ
model is the use of modern roundabouts because they
tend to decrease the kinetic energy transfer in collisions
(Swedish Transport Administration 2012). They accom-
plish this by both slowing down vehicle speeds and re-
moving specific types of collisions, such as right angle
crashes and left turn head-on collisions (Ewing and
Dumbaugh 2009). Specifically, the three basic principles
of modern roundabouts – yield at entry, traffic deflection,
and curvature of the travel path – all work in conjunction
to reduce travel speeds, while the counter-clockwise circu-
lation of vehicles eliminates many conflict points (Ewing
and Dumbaugh 2009).
A meta-analysis study of non-US reports also showed
that modern roundabouts are associated with a 30–50%
reduction in the number of injury crashes, and a 50–70%
decrease in the number of fatal crashes (Elvik 1847). In
the US, using data from before-and-after the installation
of 24 modern roundabouts, there was a 76% reduction in
injuries and an 89% reduction in fatalities (Retting et al.
2001). A Swedish study found that the observed number
of pedestrian crashes on single-lane roundabouts was 3–4
times lower than what was predicted, which suggests
that single-lane roundabouts should be preferred over
other designs in pedestrian-heavy areas (Brude and
Larsson 2000).
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On the other hand, when subgroup analyses are con-
ducted, modern roundabouts seem to be effective only
among certain populations. This may be because mod-
ern roundabouts add a dimension of complexity that,
while slowing the driver, may also frustrate and distract
the driver. For example, one study found that modern
roundabouts increase the number of injury crashes in-
volving bicyclists by 27% (Daniels et al. 2008). Another
study found that replacing traffic lights with modern
roundabouts increases the number of injury crashes in-
volving vulnerable road users (i.e., pedestrians, cyclists,
moped drivers, and motorcyclists) by 28%. This is espe-
cially alarming because vulnerable road users are already
more likely to be fatally or seriously injured in crashes
(De Brabander and Vereeck 2006). Therefore, depending
on user and road characteristics, installation of modern
roundabouts may be more harmful than beneficial.
Nevertheless, while there are some specific findings
that suggest otherwise, most studies on modern round-
abouts seem to point to a positive effect. This is especially
true in European countries where roundabouts are very
common (Ewing and Dumbaugh 2009). Other countries
that are not as accustomed to modern roundabouts, how-
ever, may confront unintended consequences from install-
ing these circular intersections. For example, the United
States has only had limited experience with using modern
roundabouts (Retting et al. 2001). In turn, many people
mistake them for traditional traffic circles (Ewing and
Dumbaugh 2009). This is potentially dangerous because
drivers typically enter traffic circles at around 30 mph,
whereas modern roundabouts are designed for speeds of
up to only about 15 mph (Retting et al. 2001). If people in
the region do not know how to properly use modern
roundabouts, then the road system may become more
dangerous after their installation. It is important to take
note of the differences in traffic culture before installing
modern roundabouts at intersections.
Speed humps
Speed humps are raised sections of pavement that are
usually built from curb to curb. They are approximately
12 ft long and have a maximum height of 4 in. (Ben-
Joseph 1995). Speed humps help reduce vehicle speeds
by forcing drivers to slow down. If they don’t, the
hump exerts a vertical force on the vehicle—the faster
the vehicle is moving, the stronger the force. The dis-
comfort felt by the drivers helps encourage them to
lower their driving speed. Speed humps are normally
applied in residential neighborhoods; along with decreas-
ing speed, they also help increase the safety of residential
streets, improve the quality of residential neighborhoods,
and improve the traffic flow in residential areas (Fazzalaro
2006).
Speed humps have been found to be efficacious in terms
of harm minimization, and are especially appropriate in
areas with a high concentration of vulnerable road users.
One study found that within residential neighborhoods,
living within a block of a speed hump was correlated with
almost a 2-fold reduction in the odds of injury. This pro-
tective effect was even greater for children; children living
within one block of a speed hump showed a 2.5-fold re-
duction in the odds of injury (Tester et al. 2004). Another
study found that the average reduction in injury collisions
attributable to speed humps (44%) was twice that of sites
where only speed enforcement cameras were used to con-
trol speeds. Furthermore, speed humps were the only type
of element found to significantly decrease the number of
fatal and serious crashes as compared to speed enforce-
ment cameras and various narrowing or horizontal deflec-
tions (Mountain et al. 2005).
However, the installation of speed humps is not ideal for
all situations, such as on bus and truck routes (http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pedestrians/traffic-calming.
shtml; Parkhill et al. 2007). Variations to the standard
speed hump design have also been created to better ac-
commodate local infrastructure. For example, New York
City implemented speed tables, which are speed humps
with flat tops, as a traffic calming measure. However,
speed tables were found to not reduce the total number of
crashes (Ewing et al. 2013). Some system designers have
also shown concern over the fact that speed humps may
increase the amount of time it takes for an emergency re-
sponse vehicle to reach its destination. In response, speed
slots and speed cushions were created. Speed slots and
speed cushions are similar to speed humps in that they
are raised platforms that stretch across roads with the aim
to reduce vehicle speeds. However, speed slots and speed
cushions have separations in the humps so that emergency
vehicles can avoid the humps when necessary (Johnson
and Nedzesky 2004). More research needs to be done to
determine the safety efficacy of these methods and the
road and user characteristics for whom speed humps are
safest.
Pedestrian islands
About 12% of all traffic fatalities annually in the US are
from pedestrian crashes. Over 75% of these fatalities
occur in non-intersection areas (U.S. Department of
Transportation Federal Highway Administration 2013).
Many of these deaths, however, are preventable by in-
stalling raised medians and pedestrian islands at these
non-intersection areas. Pedestrian islands allow pedes-
trians to cross in two stages: once at the curb and again
at the center island. Pedestrian islands, if properly used,
provide a refuge so that pedestrians have a safe place to
wait before crossing the second half of the street. This is
especially helpful for pedestrians who walk at slower
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speeds (e.g., elderly people) since they now have the time
to cross one direction of traffic at a time (Retting et al.
2003a). Additionally, it has been shown that sites with-
out central refuges experience traffic delays because of
the close proximity of vehicles to pedestrians (Griffiths
et al. 1984). Thus, pedestrian islands are a method to
separate pedestrians and vehicles by space so that various
road users do not come into physical contact with one
another. This means that pedestrian islands and raised
medians provide a safe haven for people, while simul-
taneously increasing the traffic flow of the road system
(Bowman and Vecellio 1994a).
One study found that refuge islands lower the risk of
pedestrian crashes by up to two-thirds (Garder 1989).
Another study found that pedestrian crash rates are much
lower on multilane roads with raised medians than on
those without raised medians (Zegeer et al. 2005). A dif-
ferent study on suburban and urban median types found
that arterials with raised medians had the lowest pedes-
trian crash rate in suburban areas. Additionally, the pedes-
trian crash rate for arterials with raised medians were
lower than both two-way left turn median lanes and un-
divided cross sections in central business district areas
(Bowman and Vecellio 1994b).
A significant number of pedestrians, however, fail to
actually wait on a refuge island, and instead dash across
the road. For example, one study found that only 23% of
pedestrians actually waited on the island. The remaining
77% who chose to cross the street without stopping on
the island increased the risk of injury from a pedestrian-
motor vehicle collision by not crossing with the pedestrian
signal. Additionally, inclement weather caused compliance
rates to drop even further; only 10% of pedestrians com-
plied with the two-stage crossing in cold weather, as com-
pared to 23% in warm weather (Li and Fernie 2010).
While safety may be compromised due to non-compliers
at pedestrian islands with crosswalk signals, more infor-
mation is needed on which socio-demographic character-
istics predict compliance and whether they work best in
combination with other measures.
The “noncompliance” of pedestrians at refuge island
crossings highlights the importance of road user compli-
ance more generally. The use of road safety features is
probably determined by an array of local characteristics
(demography, weather, existing road design) that require
more research.
Enforcement under vision zero
As noted throughout this paper, VZ shifts the emphasis
from the “unsafe driver” to the “unsafe road” (Elvebakk
2007). However, since VZ takes into account the entire
road system, only focusing on the design and construc-
tion of safer roads is not enough. Traffic crashes have a
multitude of causes; different enforcement strategies
need to be implemented to complement road design ele-
ments. Some examples of enforcement techniques pro-
posed under VZ include technological improvements in
motor vehicles, installation of speed cameras, the use of
red light cameras, and the professionalization of road
users (Elvebakk 2007; City of New York 2014; Walljasper
2015; http://www.visionzeroinitiative.com/; Swedish Trans-
port Administration 2012). There have been great innova-
tions in enforcement since VZ was first discussed in the
literature, and we briefly explore them here.
There are a variety of technological innovations that
have the ability to enhance the safety of vehicles. One
suggested idea is the integration of seat-belt ignition in-
terlocks, which prevent the car from starting unless the
occupants are buckled up. More controversial technolo-
gies include alcohol interlocks, which prevent the car
from starting if the driver is over the legal alcohol limit,
Intelligent Speed Adaptation systems, which support
drivers in complying with the speed limit through alerts
or by automatically correcting the vehicle’s speed, and
black boxes, which are event data recorders (Elvebakk
2007). While these enforcement strategies are deemed
paternalistic by some, advocates of these measures argue
that they are justified due to the negative externalities
associated with traffic crashes (Latour 1993). In other
words, people who break traffic laws often expose other
road users or pedestrians to significant injury risk, as
well as burden society with substantial financial costs
(Elvebakk 2007). The development of new technologies
may help to ensure that road users are behaving appro-
priately when behind the wheel.
Mobile and fixed speed cameras also encourage the
adoption of VZ principles through speed control. One
study conducted in the UK demonstrated that the use of
mobile speed cameras caused a 51% decline in injury
crashes at distances of up to 500 m from the camera site
(Christie et al. 2003). A second study in the UK found
that fixed speed cameras were effective at lowering mean
speeds on 30 mph roads by 4.4 mph and the percentage
of drivers exceeding the speed limit by 35%. This led to
a 20% average reduction in collisions 1 km upstream and
downstream from the camera (Mountain et al. 2004). Add-
itionally, a time series analyses performed in Barcelona
showed that fixed speed cameras were effective in reducing
the number of crashes and people injured in medium to
high-speed roads, though the effectiveness cannot be gen-
eralized to roads with lower speed limits and traffic lights
(Novoa et al. 2010). Therefore, system designers may want
to consider installing speed cameras in strategic locations
in order to nudge road users to follow the speed limits.
Data show that motorists are more likely to be injured
in crashes that involve running a red light than in any
other type of urban crashes. In response to this, red light
cameras are increasingly being used to help communities
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enforce traffic laws by automatically photographing ve-
hicles that run red lights (Retting et al. 2003b). In an
analysis of motor vehicle crash data from Oxnard,
California—one of the first US communities to employ
red light cameras—Retting and Kyrychenko (Retting
and Kyrychenki 2002) found that the installation of red
light cameras reduced the number of crashes at signalized
intersections and injury crashes by 7 and 29%, respectively.
Additionally, the study found that right-angle crashes,
which are associated with red light violations, were dimin-
ished by 32%, and right-angle crashes involving injuries
were diminished by 68%. Of note, red light camera en-
forcement has led to an overall reduction in injury crashes
by 25–30%, but has led to an increase in the number of
rear-end crashes (Retting et al. 2003b). However, red light
cameras still adhere to VZ principles since VZ focuses
on decreasing health loss rather than on the number of
crashes.
Taking a systems approach is just as central to enforce-
ment elements of VZ principles as structural elements.
But a systems approach is also difficult to accomplish, due
to the large number of independent actors who enter and
leave the road system.
Unlike the road transport system, many of the actors
in the air or railway industries are professional operators.
They act a certain way in their designated systems at
least, in part, because they are paid to do so; they are paid
to follow the instructions laid out by their employers. The
majority of road users, on the other hand, act as individ-
uals. Consequently, this makes it extremely complicated
to regulate behaviors, especially since interventions in
the private sector are seen as very intrusive by drivers
(Elvebakk 2007).
Nonetheless, successful implementation of VZ probably
requires an increase in monitoring road users, which the
Swedish Road Authorities (SRA) have started doing by
experimenting with alcohol and seat belt interlocks for
professional drivers. The SRA claim that 40% of transport
work undertaken on Swedish roads is from professional
drivers, thus professional drivers should be placed at the
forefront of road safety. Additionally, employers should
introduce restrictions to protect their employees, such as
regulating the use of electronics (i.e., mobile phones,
radios, etc.) while driving and mandating rest periods.
Ultimately, the professionalization of road users helps
to introduce larger safety margins into the road system
so that the likelihood of suffering an injury from a
crash is further diminished (Elvebakk 2007).
It is important to note that traffic enforcement will
need to be continually developed as the road transport
system advances. For example, an increase in the uptake
of autonomous vehicles in the near future will have signifi-
cant effects on traffic policing, both positive and negative.
One advantage to autonomous vehicles is that they are a
potential method to regulate the road system by program-
ming cars to adhere to the speed limit. Additionally, au-
tonomous vehicles can ensure that no automobile runs a
red light. However, autonomous vehicles can also disrupt
policing, especially when there is an amalgam of human
drivers and autonomous vehicles on the road as it could
become difficult for police to detect which cars are being
operated by people. Therefore, autonomous vehicles
present both advantages and disadvantages when it comes
to enforcing traffic regulations.
Conclusion
VZ introduces a new paradigm for road safety: safety
cannot be traded for mobility. Road users should not
have to risk facing death every time they enter the road
transport system. However, VZ also does not solely pro-
mote the lowering of speed limits. Instead, VZ demon-
strates how mobility and safety can be jointly promoted
if design principles are properly applied. This is evidenced
by the VZ toolkit, which provides examples of existing
traffic design elements that can improve traffic flow while
simultaneously decreasing the injury crash rates. By apply-
ing the appropriate tools, road users can arrive at their
destinations in a timely manner without getting hurt.
VZ also emphasizes the importance of shared respon-
sibility. No longer is the individual fully responsible for
road safety, but system designers should also be held ac-
countable. This radical new perspective allows for the
construction of a more integrated road system that is
built around tolerating human error. It is important to
note, though, that individual road users are still partly
responsible for safety under VZ. While system designers
have the ability to solve design and infrastructure-related
problems, road users must adhere to the regulations set
by system designers in order for the road transport sys-
tem to actually become safer. Public health scientists
need to collaborate with urban planners and city officials
to build better data systems that can predict the optimal
mix of road and enforcement characteristics given the
mix of users.
In all cases, autonomous vehicles represent a wildcard
in the VZ scenario that must be taken into account when
deciding which measures to implement and which to ignore.
Certainly, more extensive models are needed to account for
the presence of such vehicles on the road as localities in-
creasingly adopt VZ. But these models need to be integrated
with the onboard predictive analytics offered by private cor-
porate entities if they are to be optimized. Never before has
buy-in from industry been more important.
Ultimately, VZ is a balancing act regarding road safety –
the balance between safety and mobility, system designers
and road users, traffic design and enforcement, and trad-
itional engineering and public health. Under VZ, road
safety becomes a collective, public health problem that
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needs to be addressed starting with how society views the
road transport system. All in all, VZ changes people’s
perceptions of the road transport system from one that
is inherently dangerous to one that is safe and only
risky if the system is not functioning properly (Elvebakk
2007).
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